stood at his drawing board, hard by the board of L. Haworth, later also F.R.S. Whilst at uni versity he became increasingly interested in aero engines, and having gained his second degree, decided to move back to the UK because there were few career opportunities for aero engineers in South Africa at that time.
Like his father, RRJ grew to be an enthusiastic sailor and, indeed, assisted him in the design and construction of two ocean-going yachts, Perogan I and Perogan II. Both proved worthy vessels, taking part in many sailing contests held off Cape Town.
RRJ's interests were eclectic -they included mountaineering, Airedale dogs, camping, music, astronomy, and, particularly during retirement, photography in a variety of forms. He was a gardener too, and especially loved roses and orchids.
RRJ met his wife, Hilda Watney Wilson, whose father was Editor of The Cape Times, while still at university. They became engaged after a very short acquaintance and a month later his fiancee and her family left South Africa for a visit to Europe. The family was about to return home when a letter was received from RRJ saying he was on his way to the UK in search of work. A quick decision was made, a cable was sent, and very soon after, on 30 October 1937, the pair were married in St Jude's, Kensington.
RRJ had no job and no prospects of one at this time, so the first thing the couple did was to sit down and write applications. Five jobs were offered, but none appealed to him. Then Hilda said 'Why not write to Rolls-Royce?' At the time, Haworth was working as a designer in a small research design group under J.D. Pearson (later Sir Denning Pearson) in Derby. One day Pearson came down the office waving a letter. 'Do you know a man named Jamison from Cape Town?' he asked. 'Oh yes', said Haworth, 'he is a good chap'. A few weeks later, in late 1937, RRJ found himself working as a fitter/tester for R.V. Mallinson, who was in charge of the Single Cylinder Test House at Rolls-Royce Derby, under A.C. Lovesey, the company's Chief Development Engineer.
RRJ's interests in boating, especially rowing, continued while living in Derby. He also accompanied Haworth on sailing trips around the coast. RRJ spent many a holiday with his family sailing off Cornwall and, on one occasion, rescued a boatful of trippers by guiding them into harbour in a thick fog and at night using his ship's compass.
Always quiet and slow to communicate, RRJ could sometimes on holiday be persuaded by a friend to speak of sailing off the 'Cape of Storms'. One would then get a very matter-offact story of many days at sea in the Southern Ocean in a force 9 gale.
R o l l s -R o y c e D e r b y

Work on piston engines
For some years before RRJ arrived in Derby, the aero engine industry had battled with the problem of making more powerful engines to enhance aircraft capacity and performance. For a given fuel, the avenue of scaling up an existing good design was limited by detonation. Furthermore, although everything in an engine scales satisfactorily, except heat flow, the square/cube law reduces the power/weight ratio of the bigger engine.
By the mid 1930s, A.H.R. Fedden (later Sir Roy Fedden) at the Bristol Aeroplane Company (BAC), was backing the Burt McCollum sleeve valve with the Perseus single row radial against the notoriously difficult poppet valve. He followed up with the two-row Hercules, while Major F.B. Halford at the Napier Company had similar sleeve valves in a 24-cylinder, 2-crankshaft H-engine -the Sabre.
Whether the sleeve valve would beat the poppet valve was perhaps controversial, but everyone wanted more cylinders to avoid big cylinders causing prohibitive detonation. Initially Rolls-Royce went for 24 cylinders in four banks of six, and eventually there were three such engines: the Vulture (which had four poppet valves per cylinder) with traditional water cooling, and the Boreas and the Pennine, each with 24 air-cooled sleeve valve cylin ders. Boreas was designed by A.J. Rowledge in the early 1930s. It was originally the EXE and became the little EXE when the Pennine appeared later.
This, then, was the background to RRJ's first job at Derby. RRJ worked alongside another experimental engineer, D. Reynolds, making experiments to find out how the cooling of a single EXE cylinder was affected by such factors as engine manifold boost pressure and temperature, cooling air temperature, oil temperature, ignition timing, etc. The results from these tests were used to guide and interpret measurements made on the complete 24-cylinder EXE engine, which was later named the Boreas. RRJ and Reynolds continued with this single cylinder work through 1938, 1939 and most of 1940. By then the company had made the decision to concentrate aero engine development on the Merlin, Griffon and Vulture water-cooled engines. The Boreas (figure 1) was set aside and air-cooled cylinder research discontinued.
It was while working on the cooling of the single cylinder EXE that he lost his elder brother Antony. Antony, serving on the submarine , which was still being fitted out, was invited as observer on its sister ship, Thetis, for what proved to be her disastrous maiden dive off Birkenhead in 1939. He managed the closing of certain doors to prevent flooding of the entire ship. Only a few escaped. Part of the Thetis was still above water and RRJ tried Figure 1 . The Rolls-Royce little EXE engine, the Boreas. hard to convince the Admiralty that he could lead a team to save the rest of the crew. The Admiralty declined and all remaining hands were tragically lost. It was a great trauma for RRJ.
The first Rolls-Royce gas turbines
In 1939, Dr A.A. Griffith, F.R.S., who had been head of the Engine Department at the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE), joined Rolls-Royce Derby with the special task of proposing how a gas turbine could be applied to aircraft propulsion. Griffith's total concept is shown in figure 2. Air was drawn in from ducts in the wing on either side of the engine and turned to flow forward through counter-rotating turbo-compressor stages. The air was then reversed in a combustion chamber and flowed back through the outside of the turbo compressor. In each stage the gas exhausting through the outer turbine blades provided power to drive the inner compressor blades. In the design shown in figure 2, there were fan blades outside the turbine blades on the low pressure stages, providing by-pass air to mix with the exhaust gases flowing out over the wing.
Rolls-Royce decided in 1940 to go ahead with the building of a gas turbine engine to Griffith's ideas. The first step was to design what was known as the 'gas generator'. This is the high-pressure end of the power plant of figure 2. The gas generator test unit is shown in figure 3 . As already mentioned, each stage of the turbo-compressor consists of a single disc unit with a row of compressor blades driven by turbine blades at their outer ends. A fixed central tube is mounted at each end from the turbine casing in such a way as to remain con centric with it. Bearings on this tube support the discs so as to permit free rotation in either direction, and the blading is designed to drive alternate discs in opposite directions. Thus, for given incident Mach numbers on the blading, the rotation stresses are a quarter of what they would have been in a conventional machine in which alternate rows are stationary.
This unit became known as the contraflow gas generator because the axial flow along the inner annulus of the compressor blading, from entry to combustion chamber, is in the oppo site direction to the flow along the outer annulus of turbine blading, from combustion chamber to generator exit. It will be appreciated that the compressed air makes a 180 degree turn in the combustion chamber, during which a centrifugal spray of fuel is injected. Thus it is a remarkably compact unit embodying several subtle technical features, one of which is the automatic variation in relative speeds of the 14 stages as the pressure ratio of the unit increases with the injection of fuel. This was intended to avoid compressor stall.
Following the completion of the design of the experimental gas generator, it was decided that, before the gas generator itself was built, several of the more important components would be built first and tested separately. These included an air intake duct with 180 degree bend made in sheet metal and an aerofoil cascade tunnel for testing the compressor blading.
G.L. Wilde was given the job of co-ordinating the making, building and testing of these units on the Supercharger Test Rig. This was in addition to his responsibility for carrying out the centrifugal supercharger development work to raise the power of Merlin engines in the fighter and bomber aircraft for the RAF. This work, which had absolute priority, increased in volume and intensity throughout 1940-41 and, after the first two CR1 component rigs had been commissioned, it was decided to increase the effort on the gas turbine by transferring RRJ from the Boreas engine. Thus he became one of the first experimental engineers at Rolls-Royce to work full time on a gas turbine engine.
RRJ quickly built up a sizeable team to tackle the many problems which became apparent in the CR1 design. The most important of these were inefficient compression and expansion in the blading due to gas leakage, excessive pressure losses in the reversed flow combustion chamber and maldistribution of gas temperature leaving the combustion chamber into the turbine annulus due to uneven fuel spray.
These problems were sufficiently severe to prevent the engine accelerating and running self-sustained after ignition. To enable the unit to run, it was necessary to blow compressed air into the CR1 intake from an auxiliary compressor to compensate for the excessive pres sure losses within the engine.
With hindsight it will be argued that these problems should have been foreseen, but it must be remembered that performance analysis and techniques in this new field of engi neering at that time were in their infancy. The team under RRJ was tackling the development of a particularly difficult machine in which the compressor and turbine could not be sepa rated for independent performance and efficiency assessment.
It was virtually impossible to measure total head pressure directly at the interstage posi tions of the compressor. These pressures had to be estimated from annulus wall static pres sures, measured air mass flow rate and interpolation of temperatures. Only the roughest assessment of the location of the high total pressure loss regions within the blading could be obtained. These attempts to assess losses using the established compressible flow aerody namic theory led to the production by RRJ and D.L. Mordell of a series of non-dimensional compressible flow curves. These included curves for a range of flow efficiencies. The curves were convenient to use and were widely published (1-4)* for general use in duct flow analysis, aerofoil cascade performance, nozzle flow and gas turbine performance generally. The Q curves, as they became known, contributed to speeding up analysis at all stages of research, design and development.
The problems outlined above made progress with the development of the CR1 very slow. Surprisingly, the work was allowed to continue throughout the war without any real hope of success. In contrast, the development of the Whittle jet engine, which was proceeding in par allel at the Ministry-Rover factory at Bamoldswick, was making encouraging progress. By 1943 Rolls-Royce decided to switch to developing the Whittle-type engine. Development of the CR1 continued into 1944. In that year, RRJ wrote a report 'The position of the internal combustion turbine development at Derby'. This report outlined the main problems still to be overcome in the CR1, the prospects of success and the scale of design, development and manufacturing effort required to produce a complete engine. The report was considered by the engineering directorate but not implemented. One final effort was made, using a low loss combustion system and much greater supercharging of the intake from a 2000 HP driven compressor during run-up, which did achieve self-sustained running of the gas generator. Perhaps this clinched the decision that the inherent problems were not soluble in a reasonable time and the work on CR1 development was closed down towards the end of 1944.
It is natural that RRJ, having put heart and soul into this fascinating and demanding enter prise, and having developed great understanding of compressible gas flow, was frustrated by * Numbers in this form refer to entries in the bibliography at the end of the text. the sudden disappearance of an engine and a programme that he had been able to call his own for four years. Gas turbine work was now centred on the Whittle derivations at Bamoldswick, whilst RRJ remained at Derby, working under J.E. Ellor on turbine engine controls (5, 6) and exhaust reheat. During this period he started contemplating a return to South Africa, as evidenced by letters to his wife's father in Cape Town.
In 1946 he wrote a report for Griffith (7) proposing a new contraflow engine, CR2 (RB 78), designed to overcome the problems of the original CR1. By this time no-one had much faith in the counter-rotating engine concept and work did not proceed. However, alternative work was found for RRJ under Griffith.
In March 1949 RRJ took his wife and four children on a visit to South Africa. Apart from seeing their families, RRJ used the visit to seek job opportunities. He returned after six weeks with three job offers, leaving the family to stay for six months. On his return he found Rolls-Royce wanting him to sign a three-year contract. This he did not wish to do and dis closed his South African offers. After a while it was decided that perhaps he had better leave, but by then the South African jobs had evaporated, so he fell between two stools. Lord Hives wrote on 10 January 1950 dispensing with RRJ's services, but continuing to pay him until July. Before the end of 1950 he was working for Dr S.G. Hooker (later Sir Stanley Hooker, F.R.S.) in the Engine Division of the Bristol Aeroplane Company.
B r is t o l
Early work on ramjets and Bloodhound M kl
Hooker himself had left Rolls-Royce at the end of 1948, after a disagreement with Lord Hives*. During early CR1 work, RRJ had really been reporting to Hooker, albeit under A.C. Lovesey's reference, so Hooker knew him well. Hooker had succeeded F. Owner as Chief Engineer of the Engine Division at Bristol in 1950. He was building up the strength, particu larly in gas dynamics and gas turbine component technology, by recruitment into the research department. RRJ's wide background on these issues was of course particularly appropriate.
From early in 1949 the Bristol Aeroplane Company had been involved at high level in dis cussions with the Government on entering the guided weapon (GW) field, possibly in con junction with Ferranti. Initial intentions were directed towards a bi-fuel, rocket-powered, surface-to-air missile, but, following the secondment to the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) of a small team under D.J. Farrar (later appointed Chief Designer, Guided Weapons), the decision was taken to study the potential of ramjets. The RAE had been doing both theo retical and practical work on ramjets, which had led to project studies of a multi-ramjet mis sile. Already two industrial teams were at work on surface-to-air missiles, both planning to use bi-fuel rockets. This was considered the safe power source. Ramjets, though offering better potential, were considered a more difficult powerplant, and thus a longer term devel opment.
The RAE also had a project design for a twin 6" ramjet test vehicle, so the first contract received by Bristol in the late summer of 1949 was to complete the design, make the vehicle and test it in conjunction with the RAE. This was followed by a contract for project studies on multi-ramjet missiles.
In the autumn of 1949 it became urgent for the Engine Division to provide rigs and tech nical support for the RAE test vehicle and M.A. Nedham was appointed Engineer-in-Charge of Ramjets. A small and competent team was built up for this and to provide some help with the GW project design work in the Aircraft Division.
Considerable political emphasis was being given to the development of both air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles because of the recent Russian development of an atomic bomb, which then would still have to be delivered by aircraft. By 1950 there had been a number of set backs with rocket motor development and more had been learnt of American ramjet work. A senior team was therefore sent, in October of 1950, to see what possible support might be available. It was headed by J.E.P. Dunning, Assistant Director of Engine Research and Development, together with staff from the RAE Guided Weapon and Aero Supersonics Departments, and Farrar and Hooker from Bristol. It was discovered that significant flight experience existed on much larger ramjets with better efficiency. Whereas all missile project studies in the UK had so far been limited to ramjets no larger than 10" diameter, which meant that 4 engines were required for sufficient performance, it was now possible to con sider much more practical two-engine layouts. By the end of 1950 the twin-engine concept was hardening, with requirements for ramjets of between 14" and 16" diameter. Project work done on test-bed air supplies and rigs confirmed that this size of engine could be accommo dated at Bristol. To gain advantage from the practical experience available in the USA, a technical exchange agreement was negotiated with the Boeing Airplane Company of Seattle who had been assessing similar ramjets in missile definition work for the US Army. This definition programme had achieved a significant number of successful flights with ramjets of the required size, so the UK objective of getting confidence in the potential capability of large ramjets was met.
Arrangements were completed for a four-man team led by Nedham to visit Boeing in late January 1951. Early in that month Hooker decided that RRJ should join this team, and a highly successful period of some seven weeks was spent completing the project design of a 16" flight engine and detailing an 'Iron Horse' rig version of the engine. This latter was man ufactured and sent to Seattle for testing in May. RRJ and Nedham went on to visit Marquardt, who were building on their work for the larger and higher Mach-number ramjets for the long range, surface-to-air Bomarc missile. They also called at the Applied Physics Laboratory of Johns Hopkins University in Washington to see the Project Managers of Talos, a surface-to-air missile with a single ramjet integrated into the main body.
Return to Bristol was not until April and, in May, RRJ was appointed in charge of ramjets, bringing with him from the company research department key people on supersonics and combustion. Nedham stayed on as his deputy and remained in charge of ramjet development.
The work on the combustor and fuel control for the RAE ramjet test vehicle programme, the JTV (Jet Test Vehicle), was of great help in building up all aspects of the ramjet team, including flight preparation and analysis. A number of problems of light-up and combustion stability in sustained flight were dealt with, leading to a first successful ramjet-powered supersonic flight in July 1951. The JTV programme was completed in mid 1952.
Bloodhound M kl
Although the engine designed with Boeing gave a high degree of confidence to the whole programme that became Bloodhound M kl, it was based on a simple fuel system and no propulsion system expected to be most difficult (i.e. the ramjet), was the first to hit a target. It bettered its specification performance and was also the first to enter service. It was subse quently sold to Sweden and Australia as well as to the RAF.
Mach 3 developments
The need to intercept high-speed bombers at much greater range and altitude had, by the mid 1950s, produced a number of second-generation missile proposals. Bristol and Ferranti were contracted to work on the longer-range project, code-named Blue Envoy. It was a joint Navy and Air Force requirement, conceived as a slim delta, with ramjets top and bottom. It was to be boosted to Mach 2.5 and cruise at Mach 3 at 70 000 feet to 200 miles range. The ramjets would need to be about 18" diameter and this was larger than could be tested on the existing sea-level rigs. The BAC Aircraft Division at Bristol was contracted to proceed with design studies and model testing, Ferranti with work on continuous wave homing, while the Engine Division was funded for a ramjet demonstrator programme in the 16" size they could test. This required the far-reaching development of intakes and of combustion systems to provide a much greater range of thrust control. Because the RAE was no longer involved in propulsion, the National Gas Turbine Establishment (NGTE) was the only government agency involved. The combination of their work and that of Dr J.S. Clarke's team at Lucas Limited, Burnley, provided a very significant contribution to the rapid definition of combus tion system design. The ultimate need for larger engines, and the importance of testing at altitude and at incidence (from Bloodhound M kl experience) pushed the case for a high-alti tude test plant.
The available facilities at Bristol, NGTE and in the USA for ramjet testing were then such that only low-altitude conditions of flight could be simulated within the complete engine with confidence. At all other conditions there was dependence on flight test at the RAE, Aberporth, and at the Weapons Research Establishment (WRE), Woomera, South Australia, with many attendant difficulties including those associated with limited and unreliable telemetry instrumentation.
Knowledge of the pioneering BMW altitude test plant in Munich and the US plant devel oped from it, as well as NGTE's plans, only served to show that a continuous system using mechanical exhausters for altitude simulation was excessively expensive. The elegant solu tion put up by RRJ was to use steam, stored as superheated water in accumulators, to drive a battery of ejectors. This facility, which became known as the High Altitude Test Plant, (HATP), was supported by the company and ministry and duly went ahead. It proved to be a very flexible tool in which Mach number, engine size and altitude could all be traded. New intake, combustor, fuel and hydraulic-system test facilities, each with comprehensive instru mentation systems dedicated to ramjet development requirements, were set up at the same time.
When the Duncan Sandys 'rationalization' of 1957 caused the cancellation of Blue Envoy, much work had been done to show the feasibility of meeting the ramjet requirement. Later this was picked up and applied to the proposed ramjets for Blue Steel Mk 2, a 300 mile range stand off bomb, on which much successful work was done before its cancellation. Continuity of work by RRJ's team was maintained throughout this turbulent period, largely through the excellent working relationship with E.B. Carter of the Engine Branch of the ministry, first as Assistant Director, Rockets and Ramjets, later as Director, and subsequently Director General, Engines. 
Bloodhound Mk2
The cancellation of Blue Envoy left a yawning void in the workload of the Bloodhound team. It was a fortuitous, brief discussion between senior Bristol and Ferranti men that started consideration of a stretched Bloodhound. Three main advances made this possible.
The Continuous Wave (CW) radar development had gone well, better boosts were avail able to give higher separation Mach number, and RRJ was able to give high confidence of meeting a performance requirement from Mach 2.2 at sea level to Mach 2.7 at 75 000 feet, to a range of 75 miles as a result of the Blue Envoy work.
Minimum change to the general Bloodhound configuration was a very firm directive, but the adoption of new guidance system and warhead, although similar in external appearance, together with other small modifications, resulted in weight increases that, taken together with the higher flight-speed, necessitated more propulsive power.
An uprating of about 20% was required, with the formidable task of achieving this within the same 16" diameter together with a very wide range of thrust control. The magnitude of the undertaking is indicated by the fact that the Bloodhound M kl combustion system was already very highly stressed with combustion intensities well beyond the experience of any other practical aero applications at the time. An increase in engine diameter would have eased the problem markedly but would have had very costly consequences for the launcher system and other equipments.
A new air-intake configuration, designed for the higher flight-speeds and power require ments, was grafted on to the same outer skin as on the Bloodhound M kl ramjets, and an entirely new combustion and fuel system developed (figure 4). The experience previously acquired in running a ramjet development programme led to a much reduced timescale for meeting objectives. This was possible because, by then, the availability of very extensive test facilities provided for the Blue Envoy project enabled ground-testing that very nearly simu lated all of the key conditions of the missile flight envelope. This, compared with the Bloodhound M kl programme, resulted in a very large reduction in the number of flight trials for propulsion purposes. Flight trials mainly became the final proof-test of standards, as dis tinct from development.
The unsurpassed capability of the Bloodhound Mk2 system, with its high standard of reli ability and customer satisfaction, can be directly attributed to the clear vision and determina tion of the leaders of the various teams and to RRJ for the propulsion and related aspects. Bloodhound systems were deployed not only in the RAF for 30 years but also in Sweden, Switzerland and Singapore. It is still in service in Switzerland. Figure 5 shows Bloodhound deployed at an RAF base in the UK. Figure 5 . Bloodhound Mk2 surface-to-air missiles deployed at an RAF base.
Sea Dart
The emerging need in the early 1960s for a new Royal Navy ship-defence missile system, as a successor to Sea Slug, resulted in intensive study within industry and the establishments. The requirement was for a supersonic (Mach 2.5+), highly agile, anti-aircraft missile for the interception of targets from sea level to altitudes of 65 000 feet, out to ranges of 50 miles. It also had to have anti-ship capability.
Much partisan debate took place on the type of propulsion to be adopted to meet the longrange requirements. The traditional use of rocket motors in many missile applications was supported by most branches of industry and by the customer, with seemingly scant apprecia tion of the advantages that ramjet propulsion could confer to the achievement of superior target-interception capability. Also, the proof of practicability of ramjets in the Bloodhound programmes appeared to be largely unrecognized. When it did eventually become clear that sustained propulsion all the way to target interception would provide much greater terminal manoeuvring compared with a coasting rocket-propelled missile, other objections to ramjets began to emerge. These ranged from the alleged unacceptability of liquid fuels in the maga zines of ships to the overall missile-configuration constraints imposed by the aerodynamics and other dictates of the propulsion duct.
After determined perseverance by RRJ and his team in promulgating the ramjet solution and overcoming prejudices, it was finally agreed as the only means by which the operational requirement could be met in full. Acceptance of this change was achieved in part by the pre sentation to all authorities of a proposal for the overall configuration of the missile that inte grated the ramjet within the main structure. It withstood the scrutiny of the various authorities and was, in outline, generally as Sea Dart is today (see figure 6) .
While all the ramjet elements of the missile were of new design, they were within the gen eral experience of the Bloodhound programmes. No major difficulties were envisaged at the outset except for a very formidable problem in the combustion area. This was to achieve the necessary performance and mechanical integrity in a chamber with a length: diameter ratio of about two, imposed by very stringent restrictions on the overall length of the missile and the accommodation of other equipment. The restriction to 172.5,/ in overall missile length resulted from the need for vertical storage in the ship magazines where deckhead heights were already fixed. Also, because the ramjet was completely buried within the missile body, internal cooling of the combustion chamber had to be adopted and this was, at the time, out side the general development experience.
Apart from the storage hazard aspects in ship magazines, a major concern initially with liquid-fuelled propulsion was that of a possible need to test metering systems, etc., at regular intervals, as was the practice with Bloodhound. This aspect was exploited by the proponents of solid-fuel rocket motors but was discounted after a declaration of intention that develop ment would achieve 'no test in service'. This made the propulsion maintenance demands of the missile no greater than those of a conventional round of gun ammunition. The objective was achieved and a proven life of 15 years ex-factory has been demonstrated and accepted without reservation.
Another feature of the propulsion system that reduced concerns over the use of liquid fuels aboard ship was that of the adoption of a 'dry system'. With this, the fuel is sealed into the tank with a single valve which opens only when the missile is committed to leave the launcher. It is actuated, together with the pyrotechnic igniter, by the rise in internal pressure of the booster rocket. During the 2.5 seconds of this phase, the pump and metering systems prime, and ramjet propulsion is established. Similarly, the thermal batteries and the isopropyl nitrate gas-generator supplying power for flight-control surfaces are initiated by the same rise in boost-motor pressure. Thus, until the missile is committed to leave the launcher it remains completely inert and can be returned to the magazine in the event of a command to cease or hold fire.
While RRJ was not closely involved with the later stages of the Sea Dart programme, its successful outcome can clearly be attributed to his skills in design definition and team man agement.
Effective use was made of Sea Dart during the Falklands and Gulf Wars and the missile system is expected to remain in service with the Royal Navy for many years to come. See figure 7.
S u p e r s o n i c p r o p u l s i o n r e s e a r c h
Creation o f advanced propulsion and research group
The period from 1955 to 1960 saw the formalization of ramjet research at Bristol and a significant increase in activities. Spurred by the perceived threat to Western Europe of attack by large numbers of high-speed bombers carrying atomic weapons, there was a growing need to increase the interception capability beyond that of the first-generation surface-to-air weapons about to enter service. The ramjet was seen as the only viable propulsion system for missile ranges beyond about 25 miles.
RRJ doubled the number of qualified engineers working on basic design and performance studies, and attention was focused on the Mach 3 weapon with high-altitude cruise capability.
The higher engine-cycle temperature and lower combustion pressures for this application required a more comprehensive treatment of the gas properties than that used in ramjet and gas-turbine engine performance calculations up to that time. A new, more rigorous, com- Figure 6 . Sea Dart boosted missile with integral ramjet propulsion system. puter-based cycle performance prediction method was devised using the most accurate gas thermodynamic properties available internationally. This method was subsequently used at Bristol for all engine performance calculations.
The existing comprehensive facilities were backed up with specific research tools including new high Mach number test rigs, the company's new, more powerful computer networks, and a control-system analogue simulator. These acquisitions raised the stature and the international image of the ramjet work at Bristol. The newly formed Bristol Siddeley Engines Ltd., with scientist Sir Arnold Hall, F.R.S., as Managing Director, strongly publi cized the ramjet group's activities and its recent successes with the ramjets for Bloodhound. The significant growth in large-scale experimental studies from the mid 1950s towards defining the Mach 3 high-altitude cruise ramjets -first for the advanced surface-to-air guided weapon Blue Envoy, which was cancelled in April 1957, and later for the air-to-surface Figure 7 . Sea Dart on launcher of Royal Navy Type 42 Frigate. stand-off bomb Blue Steel Mk2, which was cancelled in 1961 -highlighted the organiza tional and management difficulties involved in attempting to carry out research on the back of development programmes. RRJ, with a strong commitment to creating a focused, on-going ramjet research pro gramme, proposed in 1961 that a separate propulsion research organization should be set up in Bristol. He proposed that it should be staffed and funded independently from the normal ramjet development and production programmes. Whilst retaining a close and effective working relationship with the ramjet development departments, RRJ suggested that the group should build up an effective liaison with other research groups working on related propulsion problems associated with gas turbine engines. In due course these proposals were accepted and an Advanced Propulsion Research Group (APRG) was set up at Bristol under RRJ at the beginning of 1962.
The ramjet development teams previously under RRJ were integrated within the existing gas turbine development organizations. The APRG was separately funded by the Ministry of Supply against costed programmes of work towards meeting specified objectives for research into the propulsion problems of manned and unmanned aircraft at high speed.
The character of ramjet research work at Bristol quickly changed. Instead of theoretical and experimental studies being mainly dominated by the need to solve problems arising from development programmes, some practical work was done to examine the fundamental prob lems associated with powerplant design, integration and performance for high-speed aircraft. The concept of using full-scale demonstrator engines to provide design and performance objectives was introduced as a means of ensuring the studies were focused and kept within the bounds of available engineering capabilities. One such demonstrator engine programme was the propulsion system for a long-range weapon with a wide variation in cruise require ments up to Mach 4. This demonstrator first ran in the High Altitude Test Plant at Bristol in June 1963. Figure 8 shows a rig version of the Mach 4 engine with water-cooled, variablegeometry exhaust nozzle. Phase 2 of this programme involved combining a variable intake with the variable nozzle to demonstrate high performance over the speed range Mach 2.5 to 4.2. Significant pioneering work was accomplished in the fields of testing techniques, accu- rate measurement, performance prediction and analysis. RRJ's team was involved in the supersonic transport studies that led to Concorde and in the propulsion aspects of military supersonic project studies such as the PI 154 and TSR 2. Ramjet combustor technology made a significant contribution to advanced gas turbine reheat systems.
RRJ encouraged active involvement in national and international aerospace research, with senior members of the ramjet group serving on research advisory committees. They worked with AGARD groups and with Research Establishments in Europe and the USA in the field of high-speed propulsion. The launch of Sputnik in 1957 and subsequent US space pro grammes spurred interests by the scientific community and by aerospace companies in the prospects of controlled flight at hypersonic speeds. The performance and research depart ments under RRJ set up new facilities to study basic problems associated with high super sonic and hypersonic ramjet propulsion. Design of a Mach 7 cruise ramjet (figure 9) was attempted. The group was in the forefront of advanced propulsion studies throughout the Western World in the 1960s and earned an international reputation for its work. Many papers were read to learned societies (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) .
The work of the Advanced Propulsion Research Group was influenced greatly by the rapidly changing national and international scene. The implementation of the policies arising from the 1957 Defence White Paper had a profound influence on projects involving the aero space industry through the 1960s and beyond. Some of the changes benefited ramjet pro grammes, others involved cancellations. The decision to deploy Bloodhound and Figure 9 . Projected hypersonic cruise vehicle with diagram of ramjet duct.
Thunderbird in the UK led to government-supported export drives. This brought the Bristol ramjet project group into touch with airbreathing-engine studies being carried out in other countries. With ministry approval, closer ties were forged with national establishments and with aerospace companies in France, West Germany, Sweden, Holland, the USA and Canada. Information on ramjet technology was exchanged, and much valuable experience on ramjet test facilities and instrumentation was gained. In the case of Sweden, a collaborative programme of ramjet studies was launched that was to last for more than a decade, and that favourably influenced Sweden's decision to procure Bloodhound Mk2. RRJ played a major role in setting up and furthering these international agreements.
Propulsion fo r hypersonic flight
During the 1960s, considerable activity took place in the USA and the UK on assessing the feasibility of manned aircraft for Mach numbers up to 5. The requirement was for normal take-off and landing, and the propulsion system consisted of turbo-ramjets with conventional gas-turbine engines for take-off and acceleration at lower supersonic speeds. The ramjet would be progressively phased in by means of a variable-geometry intake system with the gas turbines being shut down and protected from the high-temperature environment at higher Mach numbers. The APRG under RRJ was closely involved with these aircraft project studies both in the UK and the USA. Significant experimental work was carried out using specially developed high enthalpy facilities installed at Bristol which allowed investigation of propulsion problems in cruise at hypersonic speeds up to Mach 7. Additionally, a large gun tunnel was designed and built to allow high Reynolds number aerodynamic testing of ramjet intakes and missile bodies at Mach numbers between 6 and 12 (see figure 10) . The gun tunnel is a special form of intermittent blow-down wind tunnel. Dried air from an external compressor is stored at high pressure in a large chamber, the driver, usually made from the barrel of a large-bore gun. This compressed air is released by bursting a metal diaphragm, and is used to drive a close-fitting piston at supersonic speed along a long, smooth-bore tube machined from two 105 mm gun barrel forgings. The air in the barrels is compressed and heated by the shockwaves ahead of the piston to stagnation conditions appropriate to providing a hypersonic jet when expanded through a convergent-divergent nozzle attached to the barrels. This jet passes into an evacuated working section in which the test model is mounted and provides a relatively steady-state flow for about 100 ms, during which time measurements can be taken using appropriate instrumentation. The large Bristol gun-tunnel became a valuable research tool and pioneered many high-speed instrumentation techniques with the result that the entire facility was passed to Oxford University when hypersonic propulsion studies at Bristol ceased in the 1970s. It is still in use at Oxford.
The integration of the propulsion system with both manned and unmanned airframes was led by RRJ s team working closely with the RAE and Hawker Siddeley. The contacts were established by RRJ and, in particular, with Dr D. Kuchemann at the RAE, and through Sir Sidney Camm at Hawker Siddeley. Work was also carried out in collaboration with the British Aircraft Corporation.
The Mach 5 cruise aircraft project is typical of the airframe and propulsion system config urations that were being considered. These studies showed the problems that would be asso ciated with providing an efficient, lightweight structure having adequate active cooling to protect forward-facing aircraft surfaces and internal propulsion ducting against the high stag- nation temperature flows associated with flight at very high speeds. One such project study was headed by Dr Barnes Wallis, F.R.S., with whom RRJ had been associated for a number of years. Dr Barnes Wallis was interested particularly in examining the practicalities of hypersonic cruise at very high altitude where the use of conventional aircraft structural mate rials for the main airframe might prove possible. However, no military or civil hypersonic aircraft projects were found that justified the risk and cost of development.
All the work by APRG was written up in some detail and reported to the Ministry on a regular basis. RRJ was always insistent on accurate and high-quality reporting, and set stan dards that were to become the model for future MoD-funded research activities. RRJ's standing in the aeronautical world enabled him to maintain contact at the highest level in the industry, in government establishments, scientific circles and in the military services. The co operation achieved during the 1960s between APRG and other groups had a significant impact on the analysis of many advanced proposals. This was due in particular to RRJ.
His influence extended also to academic circles. When the new Technological University was set up at Bath in 1966, RRJ was appointed part-time Visiting Fellow to the School of Engineering, a post he held for five years. Besides forging an effective link between students and industry by being involved in setting and supervising final year projects, he assisted in pioneering the teaching of engineering design at Bath. RRJ made a significant contribution to establishing the reputation of its School of Engineering. He regularly attended meetings of the Board of Studies to advise on course content and on collaboration with industry. His cau tious but well thought out approach to problems was much appreciated by all who worked with him.
Control o f company research
RRJ was appointed Chief Research Engineer at Bristol in 1965 and made responsible for planning and co-ordinating research at company level. Soon after Bristol Siddeley Engines merged with Rolls-Royce in 1966, the decision was taken to phase out the work of APRG and to transfer all staff to other research and development departments at Bristol. This reor ganization brought all research activities more closely together and made possible the co ordination of all work throughout the several groups that, with the new company merger, were now all part of Rolls-Royce.
The ultimate closure of APRG had for some time been foreseen. For example, one day, when Haworth dropped into Hooker's office for a chat, Hooker said apropos of RRJ's APRG: 'Lionel, whatever are we going to do about old Jammie?' This led to: 'Why do you ask, Stanley?' 'Well,' said Hooker, 'old Jammie is spending a lot of serious effort on Mach 7, while you and I are quietly ruining the firm at Mach 2.' This was an amusing reference to the Concorde Programme. But the shutting down of APRG was no joke to RRJ. It was a serious trauma. Some think he was never the same man after APRG was disbanded. It had been his pride and joy.
With the active support of ministry officials, both at MoD headquarters and at NGTE, a company long-term project strategy was formulated, around which appropriate research pro grammes could be drawn up and implemented. For the first time, manufacturing techniques and basic production processes were included in structured research programmes. RRJ played a significant role in introducing these wider company research plans. With ministry approval, the concept of demonstrator engines was introduced to allow practical experience on full-scale components to be gained prior to committing a new feature to main enginedevelopment programmes. The overall objective was to generate engineering data and expe rience that could contribute directly to the design and development of aero-engines where the achievement of high performance and low through-life costs was essential.
The co-ordination of all research programmes posed many difficulties, largely because of firmly established design and development principles related to diverse, previously com peting, company project strategies. However, RRJ, with S.L. Bragg at Derby, achieved an effective integration of the various activities at the many Rolls-Royce sites. A common method of reporting to senior company and government officials was adopted, covering each year's research and demonstrator programmes, together with the forthcoming year's plan in all technical work areas. The concept and format of these reports can be traced directly to the research management techniques introduced at Bristol by RRJ. P e r so n a l RRJ was able to exercise his talents best when given a team which already had drive and initiative. Although inclined to be shy and undemonstrative in circumstances unconnected with his work and in the presence of strangers, to an extent which limited his influence in some quarters, RRJ was at pains to look after each individual in his team. On the last workday before Christmas 1954, having received the notices of annual increases shortly
